A like-for-like comparison across six regions shows exactly where Nigeria would be without the 4 policy decisions of the present Administration.

By Squadron Leader Adefola Amoo (Rtd) | April 2026 | adefolaamoo.com

The Point

In my two previous articles, I modelled what Nigeria’s prices would look like today without the policy decisions made between 2023 and 2024. Those were projections based on data and methodology.

This article does something different. It does not project. It compares what the Hormuz Crisis has caused in other countries with the impact in Nigeria. That’s a live scenario that is a living testament.

I went looking for countries that are structurally identical to what Nigeria was before 2023. Countries that are fuel-import-dependent, generator-economy, informal retail markets, no significant domestic refining. Countries where the global oil shock triggered by the US-Israel war on Iran on February 28, 2026 would land without insulation.

I found thirteen of them, across six regions. I tracked what happened to their pump prices and their street prices for bread, chicken, eggs, cooking oil, and transport fares from February 28 to today.

What those thirteen countries are paying right now is the minimum of what Nigeria would have been paying today without four decisions: the removal of the fuel subsidy, the floating of the naira to close the dual exchange rate, and the direction of NNPC to supply Nigerian crude to the Dangote refinery in naira.

The tables do not argue. They compare. Nigeria is best performing in every one of them.

The Crisis That Was Supposed to Break Nigeria

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel struck Iran. Within hours, the Strait of Hormuz

was effectively closed. Brent crude surged from $71 a barrel up to $120. The International Energy Agency called it the largest

supply disruption in the history of the global oil market.

Every country that imports fuel felt it. Every country without a functioning domestic refinery felt it in full. That description covered Nigeria as recently as 2022. It does not cover Nigeria today.

The Fuel Price Comparison

I selected thirteen countries across West Africa, East Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and the Levant. Each was chosen on four criteria: near-total fuel import dependence, unreliable electricity grids, informal retail markets where cost increases pass through quickly, and no significant domestic refining capacity. These are, in every meaningful structural sense, what Nigeria looked like before 2023.

Nigeria’s petrol price has risen 8% since the war began. Its diesel has risen 11%. Here is where every structurally identical country stands.

Ghana in our same region, same generator economy, no domestic refinery is up 40% on petrol.

Cambodia is up 68%, the highest recorded increase in the world.

Vietnam is up 50%.

Haiti is up 40% and has black market fuel emerging.

Sri Lanka is up 36% and is on a four-day working week.

Pakistan, which mediated the US-Iran ceasefire talks, is up 35% and has closed its schools.

Kenya and Ethiopia appear better than most. They are not insulated but they are subsidised.

Kenya spent KSh 6.2 billion in emergency stabilisation funds and negotiated a government-to-government fuel deal with Gulf states to hold its petrol increase to 16%.

That is still double Nigeria’s. And it cost money Kenya did not have to spare. Nigeria spent nothing. No emergency fund. No G-to-G deal. No schools closed. No rationing. The structural insulation was already in place.

What the Man on the Ground Is Paying

The pump price is where the policy decision registers first. The market stall is where it is felt last. Below is what citizens in structurally identical countries are now paying for five everyday items versus what Nigerians are paying for the same things.

Bread’s cost is built from three inputs which are imported wheat, bakery diesel, and distribution transport. All three are fuel-linked. Nigeria still imports its wheat, so the insulation on bread is partial. But it is real and it is measurable: +17% against +40% across ten comparison countries.

Chicken is the most powerful single comparison. It is the convergence point where the argument becomes undeniable. Ghana in the same continent, same colonial infrastructure legacy, similar power scenario  is at $3.92 per kilogram. Nigeria is at $2.88. The only difference between Ghana’s situation and Nigeria’s situation is the Dangote refinery, the crude-for-naira arrangement, and the subsidy removal that preceded both.

Times Apr 2026; IRU; UN ESCAP transport cost data.

The transport fare is the first cost ordinary Nigerians feel when fuel goes up. It shapes what market traders charge. It shapes what workers earn in real terms. Nigeria’s transport fare increase is the lowest in the entire comparison set.

Ghana’s trotro fares are up 59%. Bangladesh rickshaws are up 44%. Haiti’s motorcycle taxis are up 60%. Lebanon is up 60% on top of a currency that has already collapsed.

Why Nigeria Is Here

Four decisions made the difference. The sequence matters.

Decision One — Subsidy removal broke the mechanism by which the government absorbed fuel costs that the market should have been bearing. Without removal, the current subsidy bill at

$120 oil would exceed Nigeria’s entire annual budget. There would be no money for salaries, hospitals, or the soldiers and members of other security agencies fighting the war against insurgency, let alone the fiscal space to manage a crisis. The pain of removal in 2023 was the price of survival in 2026.

Decision Two — Floating the naira closed the dual exchange rate that had for years acted as a a drain to the external reserve. At the old parallel rate, every imported item in every chart above would reflect a black market dollar rate of ₦3,500 to ₦4,500. The naira today, while still weaker than most Nigerians would prefer, is a single, functional currency. Nigeria’s external reserves grew from $3.9 billion net at the time of the decision to over $34 billion net by early 2026. That reserve position is part of why the government did not need to reach for emergency stabilisation funds when the Hormuz shock arrived.

Decision Three — Give the refinery Nigerian crude turned a potential into a productive national energy asset. The Dangote refinery existed before this administration. What did not exist was a government commitment to supply it with Nigerian crude as a domestic priority rather than exporting virtually everything internationally. By directing NNPC to make that supply, the administration put domestic fuel production on a foundation it had never had. The refinery now supplies roughly half of Nigeria’s domestic fuel needs. That half travels no sea route. It crosses no strait. It does not need war risk insurance. It is made here and sold here.

Decision Four — Settle that crude in naira is the quietest and most elegant of the four. When Dangote bought crude from NNPC in dollars, the dollar cost passed directly into the pump price.

Every time the naira weakened, petrol got more expensive. The naira-crude settlement arrangement broke that chain for the domestically refined portion. Dangote pays NNPC in naira. Refines in naira. Prices in naira. The result is visible in every chart above. Countries without this arrangement are absorbing the full dollar oil price shock. Nigeria, for the domestically refined share, is not.

The combination of these four decisions is why Nigerian chicken costs less than Ghanaian chicken. Why cooking oil in Lagos is cheaper than in Nairobi. Why Nigerians are not queueing at petrol stations whilst citizens in Dhaka, Colombo, Phnom Penh, Port-au-Prince, and Beirut are.

We as Nigerians need to see the comparison clearly and understand the trajectory this administration is taking the country. If the Hormuz Crisi did not happen, it would have been understandable that the benefits of the policies were too far down the road to appreciate.

The US-Iran war has starkly demonstrated the benefits of the policies.

The people of Ghana are paying 40% more for fuel than they were in February. The people of Cambodia are paying 68% more. The people of Haiti raised a revolt over a 40% fuel hike and still have no solution. The people of Sri Lanka who toppled a government in 2022 over exactly this kind of crisis are on a four-day work week. Nigeria is not.

The charts show precisely why. The data is in. The comparison is live. The question for every Nigerian reading this is no longer whether these policies worked. It is whether you are willing to say so.

In Closing

This article has not asked you to like President Tinubu. It has not asked you to forgive the pain of 2023. It has asked only one thing: that you look at the evidence honestly. Ghana is paying 40%. Cambodia is paying 68%. Nigeria is paying 8%. You live in the 8% country. What you do with that fact is entirely up to you.

Squadron Leader Adefola Amoo (Rtd) is a Nigerian Air Force veteran and long-served  public servant. He has served at the Presidency, Air Force Headquarters, federal ministries and agencies, and at state government level. He writes on governance, public policy, and national affairs.

The full data tables, detailed methodology, and source citations behind every figure in this article are published at

adefolaamoo.com

Previous articles in this series:

• Four Decisions. The Reason Nigeria Did Not Collapse in 2026 (Simple version) https://adefolaamoo.com/2026/04/07/four-decisions-the-reason-nigeria-did-not-collapse-in-2026/
• Four Decisions. The Reason Nigeria Did Not Collapse in 2026 — The Technical Case https://adefolaamoo.com/2026/04/07/four-decisions-the-reason-nigerias-economy-did-not-collapse-in-2026/

© April 2026 — Squadron Leader Adefola Amoo (Rtd).

Reproduction permitted with full attribution and a link to the original at adefolaamoo.com